With widespread use of the Internet, there is an increase 20 28.3.1.2 in concern over users' privacy. In particular, an adversary may identify the receiver involved in a communication session by observing the packet traffic. We propose a new routing mechanism, which we call packet cloaking, to protect 127.8.3.2 
Introduction
The Internet is a prominent platform for wide area network communication. Numerous applications such as webtion. Specifically, given a sender and its intended recipient, browsers, emails, and messaging software are being widely a trusted entity called a cloaking agent finds k -1 other used. These applications are highly useful, but also pose hosts in addition to the true recipient. The cloaking agent important privacy concerns for their users. For example, a then sends each packet from the sender to these k recipiuser surfing the net may not want to reveal the websites beents. Figure 1 shows a sender trying to send a packet to the ing visited. Unfortunately, user activities in the open Interreceiver (circled in the figure) at IP address 127.8.3.2. The net may be easily traced by eavesdroppers. For example, if sender first sends the packet to the cloaking agent, specifyit is observed that a user A is sending a sustained stream of ing k to be 4. The cloaking agent accordingly generates four data packets to another user B, over an extended period of identical copies of the packet and sends them to the four retime, then it is likely that A and B are engaged in a converceivers shown. Since the same packet is being sent to the sation with each other. It is therefore important to provide four destinations at the same time, it is more difficult for an privacy while packets are being routed between users.
adversary to trace the packet to the true receiver. Moreover, In this paper, we develop a routing mechanism to help if the four receivers are geographically far apart, it will be avoid the receiver of a one-way communication from beharder to localize the true receiver. Thus, it is possible to ing identified through traffic observation. The mechanism, protect both the identify and the location of the receiver. which we call packet cloaking, assumes that the network has
We now describe a system architecture to realize packet excessive capacity, and introduces an amount of confoundcloaking. The system encrypts the contents of a packet with ing traffic to increase the difficulty of tracing a communicaa key known only to the packet's true receiver, thus providing content privacy [8] against unauthorized access. In the packet will be transmitted, by a probabilistic decision, selecting the receivers of a packet other than the true reto the intended final destination. Further to [2, 11, 4, 12] , ceiver, the cloaking agent will limit the candidate receivers we quantify the impact of the pattern of network traffic on to only those nodes that have agreed to participate in the the privacy provided, using time-series analysis combined cloaking system. To quantify the system's ability to prowith k-anonymity. Recently, receiver location privacy usvide privacy, we will investigate two new metrics based on ing replicated packet transmissions is studied in [14] , for k-anonymity [13] and time-series analysis [9, 15] . These the case of a wireless sensor network. The relationship bemetrics measure the linkability of the receiver with a given tween privacy and the characterization of network traffic is sender, and account for the receiver's privacy in terms of also not discussed in [14] . how easy the receiver's location (e.g., its subnet) can be identified. Additionally, we report ns-2 [6] simulation re-3 Packet Cloaking sults to illustrate the cost of packet cloaking and its resilience to traffic analysis. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In SecIn this paper, we assume a one-way communication betion 2, we review related work. In Section 3, we describe tween a sender and a receiver. The cloaking agent, being the detailed steps of packet cloaking. Section 4 develops a central component in our privacy system, is used to gentwo metrics for quantifying privacy. Experimental results erate packet traffics for the sender. In particular, for each are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude the communication request by a sender, the cloaking agent crepaper.
ates connections to k different recipients, one of which is the true recipient. Let us discuss this in more detail.
2 Related Work Before any transmission begins, a user needs to register with the cloaking agent for authorization to use the cloaking facilities. The user may also inform the cloaking agent Information privacy has been a subject of active research about the conditions that it is willing to receive a cloaking in recent years. The foundation work in [10] presents definipacket. For example, a user may only want to help with tions of terms related to privacy. We use the term "linkabilpacket cloaking when he is not using the computer, or if he ity" to refer to the ability of identifying the receiver-sender is a good friend of the true recipient. These pieces of inforpair engaged in a communication. In [13] , the notion of mation are stored in the database of the cloaking agent. The k-anonymity is defined, when the value of a data attribute agent then provides its public key to the new user. The user is indistinguishable from k -1 other values. Our method, could also give his/her public key to the agent if he has not which hides the true receiver among k receivers of the same done so.
packet, can be regarded as providing k-anonymity in packet
After registration, the sender may now send packets routing. Recent work has also applied k-anonymity to prothrough the cloaking agent. Suppose that a sender, say S, vide location privacy [7, 3] , where the location of a user can wishes to send a packet to another user, say R. We assume only be resolved to a region consisting of k -1 other users.
that S has already signed the packet with its private key. The
We similarly investigate the location privacy of the true rerouting process comprises four steps (circled in Figure 2 ), ceiver, relative to the locations of other possible receivers.
as described below: (For example, whether the possible receivers are all in the same subnet.) Our work additionally investigates how the 1. S encrypts the packet to be sent, using the public key patterns of network traffic will impact on the privacy beprovided by the cloaking agent, and signs the packet. ing provided. To that end, we introduce a new metric that
The encryption and signature prevent the packet's concombines both k-anonymity and time-series analysis.
tents from being read or modified while it is being sent We now summarize techniques for providing network to the cloaking agent. The packet is decrypted by the privacy, which prevent packets from being traced in the agent, and S's signature is verified. The cloaking agent network. In [2], an anonymous email system is proposed.
then produces a list of k IP addresses, which it uses as The email system hides the identity of the receiver by introthe destinations of the sender's packet. ducing a number of "mix" nodes in the routing path. Mix nodes are machines that accept emails encrypted with their 2. To obtain the k receivers, the cloaking agent consults public keys, decrypt them, and send them to the next mix.
its database. The database can be queried for a set of The concept is further extended in onion routing [11, 4] , IP addresses corresponding to the nodes that are willwhere a packet is encrypted a number of times during the ing to receive a cloaking packet from S. The cloaking transmission. In [12] , the notion of a crowd is proposed, agent randomly selects k -1 nodes from the set of in which a packet is routed through a number of random candidates, in addition to the true receiver R. We call participating routers whose purpose is to confound, before a receiver other than the true one a cloaking receiver. (1) privacy [8] of the sender, and does not affect the effectivej(Z=i(ai -A)2)(En 1(bi -B)2) ness of protecting the receiver's location privacy -i.e., the contextual privacy [8] -against traffic analysis. Notice Equation 1 is a common way of comparing the similarity also that the sender's privacy may be better protected by between two real-valued sequences. Note that c(A, B) C not revealing its IP address in the packets being sent to the [0, 1], where a higher value of c(A, B) indicates a higher cloaking receivers, since these packets will be discarded degree of similarity between A and B.
anyway. Suppose an observer is able to monitor the traffic in the Another issue is that although only one packet transmitwhole network for an extensive period of time. We measure ter is shown in Figure 2 , it is possible to have more than the time in terms of time slots of equal length. Let the traffic one packet transmitter, which may not be necessarily in the observed at the output port of a sender for a fixed number m of time slots be given by a real-valued sequence S = {si} (7, 8, 9, 10) where si is the number of packets seen at time slot i. Let R (0,1,2) (with j 1, 2,... , N) denote the jth node in a network of N nodes. Assume that the traffic observed at the input port Pg measures the probability that the receiver's location in a tor he ntworfo an xtened erio of ime theobsever subnet iS revealed.
may be able to discover Rr by observing that the degree s e is revealed.
of traffic correlation between S and Rr is higher than that We now define the receiver's location privacy, denoted between S and any other receiver in K. Thus, Equation 2
by Eg(t), as follows:
captures the effectiveness of traffic observation in relating a Eg (t) = -Pg (t) (5) sender with its receiver.
We can now define the sender-receiver linkability, de- where Eg, ranging from 0 to 1, measures the location prinoted by El (t), as follows:
vacy of a true receiver. A larger value of Eg represents a better protection for the receiver's location privacy.
El(t) = -Pr(t) (3) where El, ranging from 0 to 1, measures the linkability of 5 Experimental Results the sender and its receiver. For example, if Pr is small, Rr has a lower probability of being identified as the true We have performed experiments to evaluate the proposed receiver. Correspondingly, El will be large.
method of packet cloaking. We first describe the simulation setup. Then, we describe the detailed results.
Receiver's Location Privacy 5.1 Experimental Setup
The second metric evaluates the probability that the true receiver can be localized to its subnet. Let Y be the set of We use BRITE [1] to generate the topology shown in all hosts in the network. Further, let X be the set of hosts in Figure 3 . There are seven routers (T1, T2,. . ., T7) and 18 the minimal subnet that includes the true receiver Rr. We hosts (indicated by the IDs shown under each router). Hosts now define Pg (t) as follows:
that are connected to the same router form a subnet. For instance, R16 and R17 belong to the same subnet as they decreases (Equation 2), causing a drop in the value of El are connected to T7. We have identified the link between (Equation 3 ). This shows that the sender-receiver privacy routers R3 and R4 as the critical link, in the sense that most can be improved with a larger number of participants in packets are routed through this link. The simulations are the packet cloaking. In the same figure, we also compare done in ns-2 using the generated topology. The bandwidth our protocol's performance with an "ideal" graph, obtained of each link between the routers is 100 Mb/s and the link's by assuming that there is no other traffic except that generpropagation delay is 30 ms. The bandwidth of a link beated by the cloaking agent. Thus, all the participants in the tween a router and a host is 10 Mb/s and the propagation cloaking system will have the same traffic correlation value delay is 3 ms.
with the sender, and the true receiver is always identified with a probability of Pr = . In this case, El becomes 0.95k 0.95 1 kor kkl. The performance of our protocol, consid-0.9 ering the similarity between the sender and receiver traffic, We use host Ro as the sender, and use host R12 as the k intended receiver of Ro's packets. We assume that all the hosts are willing to participate in packet cloaking, so that the cloaking agent can choose among all the hosts in the generated topology as the cloaking receivers. Each packet has a size of 1,500 bytes, and is sent using UDP. By default, packets are generated using a Poisson process at an Figure 5 shows the results over a tion 3, we use the delay of the first packet from the sender to wide range of k. We see that Eg is reasonably high (at least the receiver as the time shift value. This is reasonable in our 0.6). The reason is that packet cloaking attempts to choose simulation, because a receiver gets no traffic until it receives receivers in subnets different from the true receiver's subthe first packet from the sender. In practice, a more accurate net. As a result, packet traffic similar to that for the true correlation value may be computed by using more expenreceiver Rr, as generated by the cloaking agent, will have sive analysis (e.g., finding the average propagation delay a small chance of reaching another receiver in Rr's subnet. 
Results
We also investigate the scenario when no traffic other than that generated by the cloaking agent is active in the net-5.2.1 Sender-Receiver Linkability work. We assume that the cloaking agent is lucky enough to always choose hosts not in the same subnet as Rr. Then, the We first examine the effect of k on the sender-receiver linknominator of Equation 4 only contains the correlation value ability in terms of El. Figure 4 shows that El increases with of the true recipient, yielding a minimal value of Pg and the value of k. This is because when k increases, the new correspondingly a maximal value of Eg. This "ideal" situaparticipants will receive packets from the sender, thereby tion is shown in Figure 5 . We can see that Eg increases with increasing their correlation values (Equation 1). As a rek until k = 13. This is because all the k cloaking receivers sult, the probability of the true receiver being identified, Pr, have the same correlation with the sender, while other nonparticipants have a zero correlation. Thus, Equation 4 repacket cloaking approach based on sending identical packduces to 1. The corresponding value of Eg becomes 1-ets from a sender to a number of cloaking receivers, with which increases with k (Equation 5). When k > 13, Eg permission by both the sender and the receivers. We predrops, since all the hosts in the subnets other than Rr's have sented the architecture of the proposed system. We also been chosen as the cloaking receivers, thus forcing the hosts developed two privacy metrics to validate our methods.
in the same subnet as the true receiver R12 (i.e., Ril, R13, R14 and R15) to be chosen as cloaking receivers (c.f. Fig 
